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HOW TO HAVE MORE THINGS BY
FORGETTING HOW TO COUNT THEM
ASAF KARAGILA AND PHILIPP SCHLICHT
In loving memory of Matti Rubin
Abstract. Cohen’s first model is a model of Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory in
which there is a Dedekind-finite set of real numbers, and it is perhaps the
most famous model where the Axiom of Choice fails. We force over this model
to add a function from this Dedekind-finite set to some infinite ordinal κ.
In the case that we force the function to be injective, it turns out that the
resulting model is the same as adding κ Cohen reals to the ground model, and
that we have just added an enumeration of the canonical Dedekind-finite set.
In the case where the function is merely surjective it turns out that we do
not add any reals, sets of ordinals, or collapse any Dedekind-finite sets. This
motivates the question if there is any combinatorial condition on a Dedekind-
finite set A which characterises when a forcing will preserve its Dedekind-
finiteness or not add new sets of ordinals. We answer this question in the
case of “Adding a Cohen subset” by presenting a varied list of conditions
each equivalent to the preservation of Dedekind-finiteness. For example, 2A is
extremally disconnected, or [A]<ω is Dedekind-finite.
1. Introduction
Cohen developed the method of forcing to prove that Cantor’s Continuum Hy-
pothesis is not provable from the axioms of Zermelo–Fraenkel and the Axiom of
Choice. He then quickly adapted the known techniques for producing models where
the Axiom of Choice fails using atoms (or urelements) to match the method of forc-
ing. His models, therefore, proved that the Axiom of Choice does not follow from
the rest of the axioms of Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory. In this model there is a
canonical set of real numbers which is Dedekind-finite, that is infinite but without
a countably infinite subset.
Over the years we see time and time again how rich and interesting the theory
of Cohen’s first model is. Recently, for example, Beriashvili, Schindler, Wu, and Yu
proved in [1] that in Cohen’s first model there is a Hamel basis for the real numbers
as a vector space over the rational numbers.
From a modern perspective, Cohen’s first model is constructed by adding a
countable sequence of Cohen reals, and then “forgetting the enumeration, while
remembering the set” using a method called symmetric extensions that extends the
method of forcing and is the main tool in proving consistency results related to
the Axiom of Choice. We give an overview of this technique in section 2 and an
overview of Cohen’s first model in section 3.
In this paper we show that forcing over Cohen’s first model can have some
counterintuitive results. Our two main results to that effect are Theorem 4.2, which
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shows that we can introduce an arbitrary enumeration of the canonical Dedekind-
finite set and the resulting model is itself the appropriate Cohen extension of the
ground model; and Theorem 5.1 where we show that an analogue of the Levy
collapse adds a surjection from the canonical Dedekind-finite set onto any fixed
ordinal, but does not add new sets of ordinals. In particular, this forcing preserves
Dedekind-finiteness of sets in Cohen’s first model.
Forcing (or generic) extensions of Cohen’s first model were studied by Monro
in [12], where he shows that it is possible to add by a forcing extension a set
which cannot be linearly ordered. This shows that, unlike the Axiom of Choice, the
statement “every set can be a linearly ordered” is not preserved when taking generic
extensions. This line of study was extended more recently by Hall, Keremedis,
and Tachtsis in [4] where the authors study Monro’s model, as well as a generic
extensions of their own doing, in order to show the unprovability of certain weak
choice principles related to ultrafilters on ω.
Some of our arguments (Theorem 5.1 in particular) are based on ideas in another
work of Monro [11] (later developed by the first author in [9] and by Shani in [13]),
where adding Cohen subsets to Dedekind-finite sets is used iteratively to prove the
independence of certain weak choice principles from one another. In these works it
is crucial that no new sets of ordinals are added, and in particular no real numbers.
When working over Cohen’s first model, this means that Dedekind-finiteness is
preserved by adding a Cohen subset.
In section 6 we study Dedekind-finite sets which remain Dedekind-finite after
adding a Cohen subset to them. We give 10 different equivalent conditions for this
preservation, and we show that if the Dedekind-finite set is a set of real numbers,
like in Cohen’s first model, then these conditions are satisfied.
2. Preliminaries
Since we are dealing with models of ZF and with cardinals, it is worth clarifying
what we mean by cardinals. We say that a set X can be well-ordered, or that it is
well-orderable, if there is an ordinal α and a bijection f : X → α. If X can be well-
ordered, the cardinal of X is the smallest ordinal in bijection with X . If, however,
X cannot be well-ordered, we utilise Scott’s trick and define its cardinal as the set
{Y ∈ Vα | ∃f : X → Y a bijection}, where α is the least ordinal for which the set
is not empty. The letters κ and λ will always denote well-ordered cardinals.
We say that a set X is Dedekind-finite if it has no countably infinite subset,
although we will use the term Dedekind-finite exclusively to mean that it is also
infinite, as finite sets already have a much shorter name. It is a simple exercise
to prove that X is Dedekind-finite if and only if every injection f : X → X is a
bijection. We note that if X is a Dedekind-finite set which can be linearly ordered,
e.g. a subset of the real numbers, then [X ]<ω = {a ⊆ X | a is finite} is Dedekind-
finite as well. This is because every finite subset of X can be uniformly enumerated,
so the union of countably many finite subsets will be a countable subset of X . Note
that it is possible that X is a Dedekind-finite set while [X ]<ω is Dedekind-infinite,
for example
⋃
{Pn | n < ω} where each Pn is a pair, and no infinite family of pairs
admits a choice function (such set is sometimes referred to as a Russell set, or a
socks set).
Our forcing terminology is standard. We say that P is a notion of forcing if it is
a partially ordered set with a maximum, 1P. We call the elements of P conditions,
and we say that a condition q is stronger than a condition p, or that it extends
p, if q ≤ p. We also follow Goldstern’s alphabet convention which dictates that if
p, q are both conditions in P, then p will not denote a stronger condition than q.
If two conditions have a joint extension we say that they are compatible, otherwise
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they are incompatible. P-names are denoted by x˙, and canonical names for ground
model objects are denoted by xˇ when x is the object in the ground model.
IfX is a set, Add(ω,X) is the forcing whose conditions are finite partial functions
p : X×ω→ 2. We denote by supp(p) the support of p, which is the maximal (finite)
subset of X such that p : supp(p) × ω → 2. In the context of ZF, if A is a set, we
denote by Add(A,X) the set of partial functions p : X × A → 2 such that dom p
can be well-ordered and |p| < |A|.
Finally, given a family of P-names, {x˙i | i ∈ I}, we denote by {x˙i | i ∈ I}
• the
obvious name this family defines, that is {〈1P, x˙i〉 | i ∈ I}. This notation extends
to ordered pairs and to sequences as well. Using this notation, xˇ = {yˇ | y ∈ x}•.
2.1. Symmetric extensions. The method of forcing, albeit very useful, preserves
the Axiom of Choice when it holds in the ground model. In order to accommodate
consistency proofs related to the failure of the Axiom of Choice we need to extend
the method of forcing. Let P be a notion of forcing, and let π be an automorphism
of P. Then π acts on P-names via this recursive definition:
πx˙ = {〈πp, πy˙〉 | 〈p, y˙〉 ∈ x˙}.
Let G be a group of automorphisms of P. We say that F is a filter of subgroups
over G if it is a filter on the lattice of subgroups, namely it is a nonempty family
of subgroups of G closed under finite intersections and supergroups. We say that
F is normal if whenever H ∈ F and π ∈ G , πHπ−1 ∈ F as well.
We call 〈P,G ,F 〉 a symmetric system if P is a notion of forcing, G is a subgroup
of Aut(P), and F is a normal filter of subgroups over G . In all cases it is enough
to require that F is a basis for a normal filter instead of a filter.
Let us fix a symmetric system for the rest of the section. We denote by symG (x˙)
the group {π ∈ G | πx˙ = x˙}, also called the stabiliser of x˙. We say that x˙ is
F -symmetric if symG (x˙) ∈ F . When x˙ is F -symmetric, and this condition holds
hereditarily for the names in x˙, we say that x˙ is hereditarily F -symmetric. The
class HSF denotes the class of all hereditarily F -symmetric names. When the
symmetric system is clear from the context, and here it will always be clear from
context, we omit the subscripts.
The forcing relation can be relativised to HS, and we use HS to denote this
relativisation.
Lemma (The Symmetry Lemma). Let p ∈ P be a condition, π ∈ Aut(P), and
let x˙ be a P-name, then p  ϕ(x˙) ⇐⇒ πp  ϕ(πx˙). Moreover, if π ∈ G and
x˙ ∈ HS, then we can replace  by HS.
The first part of the proof appears as Lemma 14.37 in [7], and the last sentence
is an easy consequence of the fact that x˙ ∈ HS if and only if πx˙ ∈ HS.
Theorem. Let G ⊆ P be a V -generic filter and let M = HSG = {x˙G | x˙ ∈ HS}.
Then M is a transitive class model of ZF in V [G] such that V ⊆M .
The model M in the theorem is called a symmetric extension (of V ). The
theorem appears in [7] as Theorem 15.51.
3. Cohen’s first model
Cohen’s first model is the classical example of a model of set theory where the
Axiom of Choice fails. This model was investigated by Halpern and Levy in [5]
where they prove that every set in the model can be linearly ordered, and much
more. (The model is sometimes referred to as the Halpern–Levy, or the Cohen–
Halpern–Levy model.) This model has many presentations in the literature (see
4 ASAF KARAGILA AND PHILIPP SCHLICHT
Chapter 5 in [8] for a comprehensive analysis of the construction, for example). For
convenience of the reader we give a brief overview of the construction here as well.
We assume that V satisfies ZFC,1 and we take P to be Add(ω, ω). Our group of
automorphisms is given by the group of finitary permutations of ω acting on P in
the natural way:
πp(πn,m) = p(n,m),
or equivalently: πp(n,m) = p(π−1n,m).2 And finally, F is the filter of subgroups
generated by {fix(E) | E ∈ [ω]<ω}, where fix(E) = {π ∈ G | π ↾ E = id}.3 If
fix(E) ⊆ sym(x˙), we say that E is a support for x˙.
For each n, define the name a˙n as the canonical name for the nth Cohen real,
i.e. {〈p, mˇ〉 | p(n,m) = 1}, and let A˙ = {a˙n | n < ω}
•.
Claim 3.1. If π ∈ G , then πa˙n = a˙pin, therefore πA˙ = A˙. Consequently, A˙ ∈ HS.
Proposition 3.2. 1 HS A˙ is Dedekind-finite.
Proof. Suppose that f˙ ∈ HS and p HS f˙ : ωˇ → A˙. Let E be a support for f˙ , and
without loss of generality supp(p) ⊆ E as well.
Let n /∈ E be some natural number, and assume towards contradiction that
q ≤ p is a condition such that q HS f˙(mˇ) = a˙n for some m < ω. Let j < ω be
some natural number such that j /∈ E ∪ supp(q), and let π be the 2-cycle (n j).
Then the following hold:
(1) π ∈ fix(E) and therefore πp = p and πf˙ = f˙ .
(2) πa˙n = a˙j .
(3) πq is compatible with q, since the only coordinates changed between πq
and q are j and n, but these are mutually exclusive to the conditions.
(4) πq HS πf˙(πmˇ) = πa˙n which is to say, by the above, πq 
HS f˙(mˇ) = a˙j .
Therefore q ∪ πq HS “a˙n = f˙(mˇ) = a˙j and a˙n 6= a˙j”. This is impossible, therefore
the assumption that there are such q and m must be false. Therefore, p forces that
the range of f˙ is finite, and in fact a subset of {a˙n | n ∈ E}
•, so in particular, p
must force that f˙ is not injective. 
In the following two sections we work in the Cohen model. We fix a V -generic
filter G ⊆ P and denote by M the symmetric extension obtained by it and the
symmetric system defined here. We will write an and A to denote a˙
G
n and A˙
G
respectively.
Remark 3.3. One can prove that Cohen’s model can be presented as V (A), namely
the smallest transitive model of V [G] containing V and having A as an element,
where G ⊆ P is V -generic; or alternatively it is HOD
V [G]
V,A∪{A}, i.e. the class of all sets
in V [G] which are hereditarily definable from an element of V and finitely many
elements of A and A itself.
The idea that V (A) is the symmetric extension is relatively straightforward, and
it is worth sketching the argument behind it. On the one hand, since V ⊆M , and
A ∈ M we immediately have V (A) ⊆ M . On the other hand, by analysing the
proof of Lemma 5.25 and Lemma 5.26 in [8], we see that if x ∈ M , then we can
assign to it a minimal finite subset, A0, of A and a name in V such that A0 is the
copy of a support of the name, and from this we can define x using A0, A and the
name from V as parameters. By induction on rankx we get that M ⊆ V (A).
1Traditionally V is taken as L, but this is not important.
2While the latter definition seems more natural from a naive point of view, it is in fact the
former that is easier to work with.
3Because we work with pointwise stabilisers of finite sets, using the full symmetry group of ω
is the same as using finitary permutations.
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4. Injective collapse
For two sets X and Y , define Colinj(X,Y ) as the partial order given by well-
orderable partial injections p : X → Y . We note that Colinj(X,Y ) is isomorphic
to Colinj(Y,X). In this section we will focus on Colinj(A, κ) when κ is an infinite
ordinal,4 and since A is Dedekind-finite, the conditions are finite. It will be easier
to work with Colinj(κ,A) instead, and as it is isomorphic to Colinj(A, κ), we can do
that without a problem.
Let f : κ→ ω be a finite partial injection, and let q˙f denote the following name:
q˙f =
{
〈αˇ, a˙f(α)〉
• | α ∈ dom f
}•
.
Claim 4.1. If Colinj(κˇ, A˙)
• = {q˙f | f : κ → ω is a finite partial injection}
•, then
(Colinj(κˇ, A˙)
•)G = Colinj(κ,A). In particular, if p forces that q˙ is a name for a
condition in Colinj(κ,A), then there is p
′ ≤ p and f such that p′  q˙ = q˙f .
Theorem 4.2. Let F : κ → A be an M -generic function for Colinj(κ,A). Then
F is V -generic for Add(ω, κ). In particular, M [F ] = V [F ], and all cardinals are
preserved.
Since F is not a filter, byM -generic we mean that in every denseD ⊆ Colinj(κ,A)
in M , there is some p ∈ D such that p ⊆ F . In other words, F is the function given
by the generic filter.
Proof. For a pair p ∈ P (where P = Add(ω, ω)) and a name q˙f , let rp,f be the
condition in Add(ω, κ) defined by rp,f (α, n) = p(f(α), n).
If D∗ is a dense subset of Add(ω, κ), then we define a name for a subset of
Colinj(κ,A):
D˙ = {〈p, q˙f 〉 | ∃r ∈ D
∗ such that f : supp(r) → ω is injective and r = rp,f}.
We claim that D˙ is a name for a dense set. Suppose that q˙f ′ is any condition. Let p
′
be some condition such that supp(p′) = rng(f ′) (we may extend f ′ if necessary, thus
strengthening q˙f ′), and let r
′ = rp′,f ′ . By density there is some r ∈ D
∗ such that
r ≤ r′, then we can extend f ′ to any injective f and define p by p(f(α), n) = r(α, n).
Then by definition, 〈p, q˙f 〉 ∈ D˙ so p  q˙f ∈ D˙. But p ≤ p
′ and q˙f ′ ⊆ q˙f . In other
words, for every name q˙f ′ for a condition in Colinj(κ,A) we showed that every
condition in P can be strengthened to one which forces some extension of q˙f ′ to be
in D˙.
Suppose now that F is an M -generic function for Colinj(κ,A), and let D
∗ ∈ V
be a dense open subset of Add(ω, κ). Let D˙ be the name obtained from D∗ as
above, since F is M -generic, there is some p ∈ G and q˙f such that for some r ∈ D
∗,
r = rp,f and q˙
G
f ⊆ F . But this means that r ⊆ F , when F is seen as a function
from κ × ω → 2, replacing each Cohen real in A by its characteristic function.
Therefore F is V -generic for Add(ω, κ) as wanted. Finally, since A = rngF and
M = V (A) ⊆ V [F ], we have M [F ] = V [F ] as well. 
Corollary 4.3. The symmetric extension of V given by imitating Cohen’s first
model, using Add(ω, κ) (with finitary permutations of κ, etc.) and F as in Theorem 4.2
as the generic, is M .
Proof. This is true sinceM = V (A), and the argument for this equality is the same
even when using Add(ω, κ), which is easy to see from analysing the same proofs as
in the case κ = ω.5 
4We can of course assume it is a cardinal, but the assumption is never used.
5We can also obtain the same by applying Feferman’s theorem appearing as Problem 23 in
Chapter 5 of [8] instead of the proof analysis.
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Remark 4.4. The corollary means that the process works in reverse as well,
namely, starting with Add(ω, λ) with finitary permutations of λ and a filter of
subgroups generated by pointwise stabilisers of finite subsets of λ, we end up with
an analogue of the Cohen model where we have a set of Cohen reals which is
Dedekind-finite. Using finite injective functions f : κ → λ provides us with the
same proof as above.
This result is odd. Indeed, upon first reading, it makes no sense. It quite literally
implies that there is a bijection between ω and κ. But we should point out that
all it implies inside V is that there is a generic bijection between them, i.e. we can
generically collapse κ to be countable. Moreover, the generic objects that we always
refer to are not guaranteed to exist “out of the blue”, rather we have a working
assumption that V is some countable transitive model in a larger universe. And of
course, under this assumption, κ is in fact a countable ordinal.
In the case where κ is singular of countable cofinality (recall that we only required
that κ is infinite), it is well-known that adding ℵω Cohen reals (to a model of CH,
at least), adds ℵω+1 of them. When we move from A having order-type ω1 to ωω,
we seemingly add a lot more reals, which will soon disappear as we move again, say
to ω2. This is the place to point out, of course, that the additional reals are the
consequence of being able to define new reals from certain infinite subsequences of
the generic, none of which is symmetric enough to enter the Cohen model itself.
And finally, a question.
Question 4.5. It is known that the Cohen model is rather impoverished when it
comes to variety of Dedekind-finite set. Indeed, every Dedekind-finite set can be
taken as a subset of ω× [A]<ω. Will the results be the same if we replace A by any
other Dedekind-finite set in the Cohen model?
One should make the obvious, and immediate, observation that taking the above
question at face value the answer is no. Split A into two infinite parts, A0 and A1
(e.g., those reals which include 0 and those that omit it), and force with Colinj(κ,A0)
instead. It is not hard to see that we do not add any enumeration ofA1, which there-
fore remains Dedekind-finite. However over the symmetric model that is V (A0),
the result was indeed the same as above.
5. “Levy collapse” without adding reals (or sets of ordinals)
For two setsX and Y , denote by Col(X,Y ) the set of partial functions p : X → Y
such that |p| is well-ordered and |p| < |X |, ordered by reverse inclusion. This
coincides with the standard definition when X can be well-ordered, but we will
focus on the case where X = A in Cohen’s first model, meaning that the conditions
are, as before, finite functions.
In a manner similar to Claim 4.1, if q ∈ Col(A, κ) is a condition, where κ is some
well-ordered cardinal, then there is some f : ω → κ in V such that q = q˙Gf , with q˙f
defined as before.
Theorem 5.1. Let κ be an infinite cardinal and let G ⊆ Col(A, κ) be an M -generic
filter. Then M and M [G] have the same sets of ordinals.
Proof. Let X˙ ∈M be a Col(A, κ)-name for a set of ordinals. It is easier to consider
X˙ as a name in the iteration P ∗ Col(A˙, κˇ)•, whose projection to a P-name of a
Col(A, κ)-name, denoted by [X˙ ], is in HS.6 Moreover, since we have such canonical
names for conditions in Col(A, κ), and we are only interested in this iteration of two
steps, we may assume that the conditions in this iteration have the form 〈p, q˙f 〉.
6While this is quite simple to understand in this case, a more general theory of iterations of
symmetric extensions was developed by the first author in [9].
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Note that if π ∈ G , then π acts on P ∗ Col(A˙, κˇ)• in the obvious way:
π〈p, q˙f 〉 = 〈πp, πq˙f 〉 = 〈πp, q˙f◦pi〉.
Let 〈p, q˙f 〉 be a condition which forces that X˙ is a name for a set of ordinals, and
let E be a support for X˙, i.e. a finite subset of ω for which fix(E) ⊆ sym([X˙ ]). We
may assume that supp(p) = E = dom f . Suppose that 〈p0, q˙f0〉 and 〈p1, q˙f1〉 are
two extensions of 〈p, q˙f 〉. Again, we may assume that supp(pi) = dom fi for i < 2.
If p1 ↾ E = p2 ↾ E, then the two must agree on any statement of the form
αˇ ∈ X˙. This is because there is an automorphism in fix(E) moving supp(p0) \E to
be disjoint of supp(p1), which means that 〈πp0, πq˙f0〉 is compatible with 〈p1, q˙f1〉
while παˇ = αˇ and πX˙ = X˙. Here we used the fact that dom f = E, as well as
the fact the conditions are not injective. Indeed, for injective functions agreeing on
their common domain is not enough to be compatible.
In particular this means that if 〈p′, q˙f ′〉 ≤ 〈p, q˙f 〉 and 〈p
′, q˙f ′〉  αˇ ∈ X˙ , then
〈p′ ↾E, q˙f ′↾E〉 = 〈p
′ ↾E, q˙f 〉 already forced this statement, and the same for αˇ /∈ X˙ ,
of course. Therefore the conclusion follows, and therefore X˙ is a name for a set in
M , given by the name X˙f = {〈p
′, αˇ〉 | 〈p′ ↾ E, q˙f 〉  αˇ ∈ X˙}. 
This provides another proof of the known fact (see Problem 16 in Chapter 5 of
[8]) that two models of ZF with the same sets of ordinals are not necessarily equal.7
Corollary 5.2. Forcing with Col(A, κ) over M preserves cofinalities. 
Corollary 5.3. A is still Dedekind-finite after forcing with Col(A, κ).
Proof. Suppose not, then there is an injective function f : ω → A in M [G], where
G is M -generic for Col(A, κ), and f can be coded as a real, namely a subset of ω.
However, by Theorem 5.1 no new reals are added, and therefore f ∈ M . This is a
contradiction since A is Dedekind-finite in M . 
Corollary 5.4. Every Dedekind-finite set remains Dedekind-finite after forcing
with Col(A, κ).
Proof. There is an injection from every set in M into [A]<ω × η for some ordinal η,
therefore for a Dedekind-finite set in M we can take η = ω. But this means that
if A remains Dedekind-finite, so must [A]<ω, as A is a set of real numbers, and
therefore every other Dedekind-finite set remain Dedekind-finite as well. 
In M , the set A has a partition into ℵ0 different parts (e.g., by looking at min a
for a ∈ A, which by genericity must obtain each possible value infinitely many
times). After forcing with Col(A, κ) we added new partitions of size κ, without
adding new sets of ordinals. This is in contrast to the results of Monro in [12]: in
his model the generic partition is an infinite partition of A which itself cannot be
split into two infinite sets making it.
Question 5.5. In the previous section and in this one, the proofs involved in a
fairly meaningful way the Cohen forcing itself. What happens when we consider a
similar symmetric extension obtained by using a different kind of real numbers, e.g.
random reals, Sacks reals, etc., or even a mixture of these? On its face it seems that
the proof uses more of the fact that we take a finite-support product of infinitely
many copies of the same forcing, rather than the specific properties of the Cohen
forcing. To what extent can this be pushed?
7This requires, of course, that the Axiom of Choice fails in both models.
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6. Adding a Cohen subset to a Dedekind-finite set
Corollary 5.3 shows that the Dedekind-finite set A in Cohen’s first model is
still Dedekind-finite after forcing with Col(A, κ), and this leads to the problem
of finding more general condition that ensure this. In this section, we provide
characterisations, in ZF, of those Dedekind-finite sets A that remain Dedekind-
finite after forcing with Add(A, 1) = Col(A, 2). The combined results can already
be stated in the following result, although some of the notions in the theorem are
only defined below.
Theorem 6.1. Let A be a Dedekind-finite set. The following are equivalent:
(1) [A]<ω is Dedekind-finite.
(2) Add(A, 1) contains no infinite antichains.
(3) Add(A, 1) contains no countably infinite antichains.
(4) Add(A, 1) has the finite decision property.
(5) A remains Dedekind-finite in any generic extension by Add(A, 1).
(6) A is not collapsed in any generic extension by Add(A, 1).
(7) Add(A, 1) fails to add a Cohen real.
(8) Add(A, 1) fails to add a real.
(9) Add(A, 1) fails to add a set of ordinals.
(10) 2A is extremally disconnected.
Some of these conditions (e.g., (1)) already imply that A is Dedekind-finite, but
others do not (e.g., (7) holds for A = ω1 when assuming ZFC, and (6) holds for
A = ω even in ZF).
The forcing Add(A, 1) was recently studied by Goldstern and Klausner in [3]
where the authors study the possible effects of this forcing on the structure of
cardinals, as well as some specific properties of the forcing, e.g. condition (2) in
our theorem, that occur when A is assumed to be Dedekind-infinite with particular
properties.
Our theorem admits an easy corollary, which is applicable to Cohen’s first model.
Corollary 6.2. If A is a Dedekind-finite set which can be linearly ordered, in
particular a set of real numbers, then all the conditions of Theorem 6.1 hold.
In the proofs, we will use the sunflower lemma, a finite version of the ∆-system
lemma. Before we state the lemma, we fix the following notation. A sunflower is a
collection of sets, S, such that for some t, u ∩ v = t for all u 6= v in S. Moreover,
the set t is called the centre of the sunflower.
Lemma 6.3 (Erdős–Rado [2]). If a and b are positive integers, then any collec-
tion of b!ab+ 1 sets of size ≤b contains a sunflower of size >a.
The above lemma, involving only finite sets, is of course provable without the
Axiom of Choice. Less obvious, though, is that the following lemma can also be
proved in ZF, as was done by Keremedis, Howard, Rubin, and Rubin in [6].8
Lemma 6.4 (Lemma 4 in [6]). If X is an infinite collection of sets of size b, for
a natural number b > 1, then there is a finite t ⊆
⋃
X such that for every positive
number a, there is a subset of X of size a which is a sunflower with centre t.
It is easy to see that [A]<ω is Dedekind-infinite if and only if there is a sequence
~A = 〈An | n < ω〉 of disjoint nonempty finite subsets of A. We will call such a
sequence a disjoint sequence. We fix some more notation: for any K ⊆ Add(A, 1)
we define suppK = {dom p | p ∈ K}. Note that K is finite if and only if suppK is
finite.
8We can actually use this lemma instead of the Erdős–Rado lemma in the arguments in this
paper.
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Lemma 6.5. The following are equivalent:
(a) Add(A, 1) contains a countably infinite antichain.
(b) Add(A, 1) contains an infinite antichain.
(c) [A]<ω is Dedekind-infinite.
Proof. (a) =⇒ (b) is clear.
(b) =⇒ (c): Suppose that Add(A, 1) contains an infinite antichain C. We show
that Ck = {p ∈ C | | dom p| = k} is finite for all k < ω. It then follows that
D =
⋃
k<ω supp
Ck is an infinite union of finite sets and hence [A]<ω is Dedekind-
infinite. Towards a contradiction, suppose that Ck is infinite for some k < ω. Then
suppCk contains arbitrarily large sunflowers by Lemma 6.3. Since their centres are
all of size at most k, we can find two compatible conditions in Ck, contradicting
the assumption that C is an antichain.
(c) =⇒ (a): If [A]<ω is Dedekind-infinite, let ~A = 〈An | n < ω〉 be a disjoint
sequence and Bn =
⋃
i≤n Ai. Define p0 : B0 → {0, 1} to take the value 1 on B0,
and for n ∈ ω \ {0}, define pn : Bn → {0, 1} to take value 1 on An and 0 on Bn−1.
Then C = {pn | n < ω} is a countably infinite antichain. 
The equivalence of (a) and (c) was independently proved recently by Keremedis
and Tachtsis, see Lemma 1 in [10]. They prove in Theorem 3 a further equivalence
in terms of the topological cellularity of the space 2A.
Definition 6.6. We say that Add(A, 1) has the finite decision property if for all
formulas ϕ(x˙), the set Mϕ(x˙) of minimal elements of Nϕ(x˙) = {p | p  ϕ(x˙)} with
respect to restriction is finite.
Lemma 6.7. The following are equivalent.9
(a) Add(A, 1) has the finite decision property.
(b) [A]<ω is Dedekind-finite.
Proof. (a) =⇒ (b): Suppose that [A]<ω is Dedekind-infinite, and let 〈An | n < ω〉
be a disjoint sequence witnessing that. Let x˙ be the Add(A, 1)-name for the least n
such that the canonical generic subset of A contains An. Let ϕ(x˙) denote a formula
stating that x˙ is even. It is then easy to see that Mϕ(x˙) is infinite.
(b) =⇒ (a): Suppose that ϕ(x˙) is a formula such that Mϕ(x˙) is infinite. We
can assume that M
ϕ(x˙)
k = {p ∈ M
ϕ(x˙) | | dom p| = k} is infinite for some k < ω,
since one can otherwise construct a disjoint sequence. Let M =M
ϕ(x˙)
k . Since M is
infinite, suppM is infinite as well. By Lemma 6.4, there is some finite t ⊆
⋃
suppM
which is the centre of arbitrarily large sunflowers in suppM , fix such t.
There are only finitely many possible values that a condition can take on t, in
fact at most 3k, where the third value stands for ‘undefined’. Therefore, there is
a condition q with the property: there are arbitrarily large subsets K of M such
that suppK forms a sunflower with centre t and p ↾ t = q for all p ∈ K. Since q is a
proper subset of p if |K| > 1, it must be that q 6  ϕ(x˙), by the minimality of p.
Subclaim. q  ϕ(x˙).
Proof. Otherwise take some r ≤ q with r  ¬ϕ(x˙). Then r is incompatible with
all elements of M . Moreover, take a subset K of M as above with |K| > |r|. Since
suppK forms a sunflower with centre t and |K| > |r|, there is some s ∈ K with
dom r ∩ dom s = t. We further have s ↾ t = q by the choice of K. Therefore r and
s are compatible. But this contradicts the fact that r and s force opposite truth
values of ϕ(x˙). 
9One can easily formulate this lemma and its proof without using forcing. Then Nϕ(x˙) is
replaced by any subset N of Add(A, 1) with the following property: if M is a subset of N that is
dense below some p ∈ N , then p ∈ M .
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But this is a contradiction, as q 6  ϕ(x˙). Therefore M
ϕ(x˙)
k is finite for all k, and
we can construct a disjoint subset as wanted. 
Definition 6.8. A set A is collapsed in an outer model W of V if there is a subset
of A, B ∈ V , such that V |= |B| < |A|, but W |= |B| = |A|.
Lemma 6.9. Let A be a Dedekind-finite set. The following are equivalent.
(a) [A]<ω is Dedekind-infinite.
(b) A is Dedekind-infinite in any generic extension by Add(A, 1).
(c) A is collapsed in any generic extension by Add(A, 1).
Proof. (a) =⇒ (b): Assume that [A]<ω is Dedekind-infinite, and let 〈An | n < ω〉
be a disjoint sequence witnessing that. Suppose that G ⊆ Add(A, 1) is V -generic
subset of A, and let B be {a | ∃p ∈ G, p(a) = 1}. Define f(n) = a whenever
B ∩An = {a}, which by a density argument happens infinitely often. This defines
an injection from an infinite subset of ω into A, and therefore A is Dedekind-infinite.
(b) =⇒ (c): Suppose that A is Dedekind-infinite in the generic extension, and
let f : A → A be an injection which is not a bijection, then there is some a ∈ A
such that f(x) 6= a for all x ∈ A. In V , by Dedekind-finiteness of A there, the set
A \ {a} is strictly smaller in size, and thus witnessing that A was collapsed.
(c) =⇒ (b): Trivial.
(b) =⇒ (a): Assume towards a contradiction that [A]<ω is Dedekind-finite,
but suppose that p  f˙ : ωˇ → Aˇ is injective, and for simplicity, assume that p = 1.
Let ϕ(nˇ, aˇ) denote the formula f˙(nˇ) = aˇ. Let sna be the set supp
Mϕ(nˇ,aˇ) for n < ω
and a ∈ A. By the finite decision property in Lemma 6.7, Mϕ(nˇ,aˇ) and thus sna are
finite.
Subclaim. For any n < ω, {a ∈ A | sna 6= ∅} is finite.
Proof. Fix n < ω and let B denote {a ∈ A | sna 6= ∅}. Towards a contradiction,
suppose that B is infinite. First assume that for all k < ω, there are only finitely
a ∈ B with |sna | = k. Then Ak defined as
⋃
|sna |=k
sna is finite as well. Since the
sets Mϕ(nˇ,aˇ) are disjoint as a ∈ A varies, ~A = 〈Ak | k < ω〉 has an injective infinite
subsequence and hence [A]<ω is Dedekind-infinite.
Now assume that for some k < ω, there are infinitely many a ∈ B with |sna | = k.
Note that k 6= 0 by the definition of B. Since the sets Mϕ(nˇ,aˇ) are disjoint as a ∈ A
varies, the set S = {sna | a ∈ B} is infinite. This set contains arbitrarily large
sunflowers by Lemma 6.3.
Let T be a sunflower in S of size 3k+1. Since the centre of T has size ≤k, there
are at most 3k possible values for restrictions to the centre of T . Hence we can find
a 6= b in B and conditions p ∈ Mϕ(nˇ,aˇ) and q ∈Mϕ(nˇ,aˇ) with p compatible with q.
But this contradicts the fact that conditions in Mϕ(nˇ,aˇ) and Mϕ(nˇ,bˇ) are pairwise
incompatible. 
Note that sna = ∅ implies that M
n
a is either empty or contains only 1. Thus the
subclaim implies that Mn defined as
⋃
a∈AM
ϕ(nˇ,aˇ) is finite for all n < ω. In other
words, there are only finitely many possible choices for f˙(n). However, 1 forces
that f˙ has infinite range and thus
⋃
n<ωM
n is an infinite subset of A. This allows
us to construct a disjoint sequence in [A]<ω, in contradiction to the assumption
that [A]<ω is Dedekind-finite. 
Note that by the homogeneity of Add(A, 1) the above proof does not depend on
the choice of a generic filter, and since collapsing A or making it Dedekind-infinite
can be stated as a formula whose free variables are all canonical ground model
names, there is no dependence on any specific condition either.
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Lemma 6.10. Let A be a Dedekind-finite set. The following are equivalent.
(a) [A]<ω is Dedekind-infinite.
(b) Add(A, 1) adds a Cohen real.
(c) Add(A, 1) adds a real.
(d) Add(A, 1) adds a set of ordinals.
Proof. (a) =⇒ (b): Let ~A = 〈An | n < ω〉 be a disjoint sequence witnessing that
[A]<ω is Dedekind-infinite. Let x˙ = {〈p, nˇ〉 | p[An] = {0}}. A density argument
shows that x˙ is a name for a Cohen real.
(b) =⇒ (c) =⇒ (d) is trivial.
(d) =⇒ (a): Suppose that 1 forces that X˙ is a new subset of some ordinal η, and
let ϕ(αˇ) denote the formula αˇ ∈ X˙. By the finite decision property in Lemma 6.7,
Mϕ(αˇ) is finite for all α < η. However, the union of the domains of conditions in⋃
α<ηM
ϕ(αˇ) is infinite, since X˙ is a name for a new set of ordinals. Thus it is easy
to construct a disjoint sequence in [A]<ω . 
We equip 2A with the product topology. Moreover, let Np = {x ∈ 2
A | p ⊆ x}
denote the basic open set associated to p ∈ Add(A, 1). Note that 2A is a Hausdorff
space. We will consider the following notion: a topological space is called extremally
disconnected if the closure of every open set is open. Note that for Hausdorff spaces,
this strengthens the property of being totally disconnected.
Lemma 6.11. The following are equivalent.
(a) 2A is extremally disconnected.
(b) [A]<ω is Dedekind-finite.
Proof. (a) =⇒ (b): Suppose that [A]<ω is Dedekind-infinite. We will show that
2A is not extremally disconnected. To see this, let ~A = 〈An | n < ω〉 be a disjoint
sequence and Bn =
⋃
i≤n Ai. Define p0 : B0 → {0, 1} to take the value 1 on B0,
and for n ∈ ω \ {0}, define pn : Bn → {0, 1} to take value 1 on An and 0 on Bn−1.
Then U defined as the union
⋃
n<ω Npn is open. But the closure of U is U ∪ {0}
which is not open, since it does not contain any open neighbourhood of 0, where 0
denotes the constant function 0(a) = 0 for all a ∈ A.
(b) =⇒ (a):10 Suppose that [A]<ω is Dedekind-finite. Let NI be an open set
of 2A given by the union
⋃
p∈I Np. We will show that its closure is open.
Note that f ∈ 2A fails to be in the closure of NI if and only if there is some
p ∈ Add(A, 1) such that p ⊆ f and Np ∩ NI = ∅, which equivalently means that
p  g˙ /∈ N˙I , where g˙ is the canonical generic function A → {0, 1} and N˙I is the
re-interpretation of the union
⋃
p∈I Np in the generic extension. But by the finite
decision property, which holds by Lemma 6.7, there is a finite set, M , of minimal
elements p such that p  g˙ /∈ N˙I . In particular, C =
⋃
p∈M Np is a finite union of
clopen sets and thus closed. So the closure of NI is open, as wanted. 
We finish with a question of interest, as one should.
Question 6.12. As we observed at the beginning of this section, Add(A, 1) is the
same as Col(A, 2). Moreover, we proved in the previous section that Col(A, κ)
does not make A Dedekind-infinite, where A is the canonical Dedekind-finite set in
Cohen’s first model. Is there a similar characterisation for Col(A, κ), or even more
generally for an arbitrary forcing that adds a fresh subset to a Dedekind-finite set?
10This argument, like Lemma 6.7, can be made without forcing. Here we can us the topology.
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